Introduction

On October 9, 2007, the permanent representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, Mrs. Christina Rocca, gave a prepared statement to the General Debate of the First Committee in which she made a number of claims about the U.S. nuclear weapons posture. Some of the claims are either incorrect or misleading.

Mrs. Rocca’s claim that U.S. nuclear weapons are not and never have been on “hair-trigger alert” has been rebutted by Bruce Blair of the World Security Institute. But her claim that U.S. nuclear forces are planned and postured to provide the President with maximum decision time and flexibility also contradicts the very latest developments in U.S. strategic planning where the creation of a new Global Strike mission has deepened the requirement for quick-reaction strikes with forces on high alert. That development is described below.

Two other claims made by Mrs. Rocca about “unparalleled” nuclear weapons reductions and “remarkable” progress in dismantling of nuclear weapons are also misleading and are addressed below.

Alert Forces and the Global Strike Mission

Mrs. Rocca’s claim that “U.S. nuclear forces are planned and postured to provide the President with maximum decision time” contradicts the most important new development in U.S. strategic planning since the end of the Cold War: the creation of the Global Strike mission. This new mission deepens the commitment to keeping forces on alert to react very quickly to – even preempt – adversaries using or planning to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

First articulated in January 2003 and assigned to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) – the unified command with overall responsibility for planning and executing U.S. nuclear war plans – Global Strike is defined as "a capability to deliver rapid, extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and information operations) effects in support of theater and national objectives."

Global Strike is based on new political and military guidance issued by the White House and the military leadership in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The
mission builds on a decade of gradual expansion of nuclear doctrine focused on Russian and China to one aimed increasingly at regional aggressors armed with WMD. The policy and mission include one of the most controversial elements of U.S. post-Cold War policy: preemptive strikes.

Although U.S. policy has always included the option to strike preemptively with nuclear and other forces, Global Strike deepens this commitment by creating new strike plans and capabilities designed to provide the president with options to launch offensive weapons – including nuclear weapons – very quickly against WMD targets anywhere on the globe. The operational window for Global Strike is minutes to one hour. The initial public policy guidance for Global Strike and what is sometimes called the preemption doctrine was the National Security Strategy of the United States of American published by the White House in September 2002:

"We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends....We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries….The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of our enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively....To support preemptive actions, we will…continue to transform out military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.”

With this policy and other classified guidance in hand, STRATCOM has since built new command structures, planning capabilities, strike plans, and designed new weapons or modified existing ones to execute the Global Strike mission. Although often described as simply a way of increasing the President’s options for deterring lesser adversaries, Global Strike is first and foremost offensive and preemptive in nature and deeply rooted in the expectation that deterrence will fail sooner or later. Rather than waiting for the mushroom cloud to appear, a phrase used several times by the Bush administration, the Global Strike mission is focused on defeating the threat before it is unleashed.

Although primarily a non-nuclear mission, Global Strike includes the full range of options including nuclear weapons. In July 2004, General Richard Myers, who was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in a speech at STRATCOM: You reshaped “the roles and missions of that old command to better posture our military forces to defeat existing and future threats against our nation [after 9/11]….You did this by expanding the options available to the President, both from a strong nuclear deterrence standpoint and conventional and non-kinetic response options.”

Before I exposed it in public in 2005 and the Pentagon subsequently decided to cancel the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3-12) document, the editing of
revised version revealed some of the thinking that underpins the offensive nature of U.S. nuclear policy under the Bush administration. The draft doctrine described four conditions where preemptive use of nuclear weapons might occur:

- An adversary intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or civilian populations;
- Imminent attack from adversary biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy;
- Attacks on adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons or the command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against United States or its friends and allies;
- To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD.

As mentioned earlier, preemption in and of itself is not a new phenomenon in U.S. nuclear strategy, which has relied extensively on preemptive strike options against Russia and China for decades. But the draft doctrine described preemptive scenarios that require a new mindset about the use of nuclear weapons. It is no longer appropriate, STRATCOM argued during the editing of the doctrine, to use the terminology “war” when describing the situations in which nuclear weapons might be used. Rather, “conflict” should be used because it “emphasizes the nature of most conflicts resulting in use of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear war implies the mutual exchange of nuclear weapons between warring parties – not fully representative of the facts,” STRATCOM said.

Specific examples of how Global Strike has deepened the commitment to forces on alert includes the strategic bomber force, which are now “essentially on alert,” according to the Air Force, to execute Global Strike. Strategic bombers were taken off continuous alert in 1991, but Global Strike has apparently revived their alert status (although nuclear weapons are not loaded on the aircraft but stored in nearby bunkers). To practice the mission, bombers wings now periodically practice launching of aircraft in response to an emergency order from the president. In 2004, for example, 13 B-52 bombers were launched simultaneously from Barksdale Air force Base in a minimum-interval take-off with each bomber taking off within a minute or less of one another. Said the 8th Air Force commander at the base: 8th Air Force is now “essentially on alert…to plan and execute Global Strikes” on behalf of STRATCOM.

Global Strike incorporates not only strategic long-range weapons launched from the United States, but also – potentially – nuclear bombs deployed in Europe or weapons that could be moved into a theater in case of a crisis. A preemptive strike could use a B61 nuclear bomb deployed in Turkey or a strategic warhead launched from a Trident submarine off Japan. “Global” refers to where the targets are, not the range of the weapons.

At this time, ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons are still the only real Global Strike kinetic weapons. STRATCOM has proposed converting a limited number of Trident II
D5 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to carry conventional warheads instead of their current load of nuclear warheads. The conventional missiles would be co-deployed alongside nuclear missiles on deployed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), an operational concept that has created serious concern in Congress and for now stalled STRATCOM’s plans. Meanwhile, SSBNs deployed on alert continue to be tasked to launch nuclear missiles in support of Global Strike if so ordered by the president. Each alert submarine can launch its missiles in only 12 minutes from the order is given, and the warheads would hit their target 12-30 minutes later depending on where the launch occurred.

The new command structure designed to plan and execute Global Strike is called Joint Forces Component Command Global Strike Integration. It is located at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, and achieved Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2006.

The computer network system used to build and plan Global Strike options is the Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network (ISPAN) system. Originally known as the Strategic War Planning System (SWPS) to plan strategic nuclear strike plans against the Soviet Union and China, the system is undergoing modernization to incorporate Global Strike missions (both nuclear and conventional) against regional adversaries armed with WMD.

Both planning documents and statements by senior military commanders make it clear that Global Strike is intended for very quick attacks. This includes development of new capabilities to enable creation of integrated plans in the compressed timelines that are required for Global Strike, which involves delivery of strategic effects very quickly with very short timelines, any place on the face of the earth.

This development is strikingly at odds with Mrs. Rocca’s claim that “U.S. nuclear forces are planned and postured to provide the President with maximum decision time.” The Global Strike mission appears to require exactly the opposite.

**The Progress on Nuclear Weapons Dismantlements**

On the status of U.S. dismantlement of retired nuclear weapons, Mrs. Rocca stated: “Once more, it is a matter of public record that not only has the United States doubled the amount of funds dedicated to dismantling warheads, but has accomplished a remarkable 146 percent increase in dismantled nuclear weapons over the previous year’s rate, almost tripling its goal of a 49 percent increase.”

Any increase in nuclear weapons dismantlement should be applauded, but Mrs. Rocca’s statement is highly misleading and glosses over important information that, if included, would make her point very much less impressive.

“One wonders how such progress can be overlooked,” Mrs. Rocca remarked. One explanation is that the number is secret. Back in the 1990s, the number of dismantled warheads was not a secret, but in 1999 the Pentagon decided to classify the number
because it could reveal the total number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile – a number that is also secret.

How many warheads does the 146 percent increase amount to? The answer is, not that many compared with the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, and not that many compared with the number of nuclear warheads the United States dismantled each year during the 1990s. By piecing together previous disclosures of nuclear weapons dismantlements and production data it is possible to make a best estimate of how many dismantled warheads the 146 percent increase amounts to. The answer is: approximately 260 warheads.

That is not an impressive record compared with the average of nearly 1,200 nuclear warheads the United States dismantled each year during the 1990s. In comparison, the average number of warheads dismantled per year during the Bush administration has been roughly 190 warheads – including the “remarkable” 146 increase highlighted by Mrs. Rocca. Seen in a historic perspective (see Figure 1), the Bush administration has dismantled fewer nuclear weapons per year than any other U.S. administration since the Eisenhower administration.

![Figure 1: Estimated U.S. Nuclear Weapons Dismantlements 1945-2023](image)

The annual rate of U.S. nuclear weapons dismantlement has fluctuated considerably over the years depending on warhead production, war planning requirement, and priorities. From a peak of more than 3,000 warheads dismantled in 1969, the rate has dropped to less than 400 during the Bush administration.

Even with the 2004 decision to cut “nearly in half” the total nuclear weapons stockpile by 2012 – a decision that will not affect the deployed arsenal, only inactive warheads, the annual number of dismantlements is expected to remain low. Elimination of the backlog of retired nuclear weapons is not expected to be completed until 2023, according to the administration. The reason for this slow rate is that the work priority at the Pantex Plant in Texas – the only U.S. facility capable of dismantling nuclear warheads – for the next decade and a half is production of modified nuclear warheads, not dismantlement of old ones.
Indeed, in July 2003 then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers bluntly conditioned dismantlement of nuclear weapons on the restoration of U.S. nuclear weapons production capabilities: “We can only address dismantlement on a case-by-case basis until we restore our ability to manufacture new weapons.”

Mrs. Rocca’s misleading highlight of warhead dismantlements illustrates the dilemma of the administration’s contradictive nuclear policy. One the one hand, “warhead dismantlements are a key element of our strategy to ensure that stockpile and infrastructure transformation is not misperceived by other nations as ‘restarting the arms race’,” according to the National Nuclear Security Administration. But on the other hand, warhead dismantlement numbers are classified because "Dismantlement rates now could reveal, for example, the actual decline in stockpile numbers, which would reveal classified information because the size of the stockpile is classified," as one senior DOE official explained to me. The secrecy policy directly undercuts the assurance policy, and the highlighting of meaningless percentage numbers while withholding the actual dismantlement numbers creates mistrust by giving the impression that the administration is spinning its progress to appear to be more than it actually is.

The Progress on Nuclear Reductions

Mrs. Rocca’s observation that “numerically, the scale of disarmament by the United States and the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War is unparalleled in history” is obviously correct since there has only been one post-Cold War era. But her characterization of those reductions is, at best, misleading:

“It was precisely the new thinking embodied in the [2001 Nuclear Posture Review] that allowed for the historic reductions we are continuing today.”

That conclusion glosses over an important fact: that the decisions that led to those reductions were made in the 1990s, not by the Bush administration. While it is correct that the Bush administration has continued nuclear reductions, they have less to do with the Bush administration’s policies but are predominantly the implementation of force structure decisions that were made in the early- and mid-1990s by the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration.

The nuclear force structure reductions highlighted by Mrs. Rocca – the reduction of the U.S. nuclear stockpile to nearly one quarter of what it was during the Cold War by 2012, the reduction of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to about a third of 2001 levels, the deactivation of the Peacekeeper ICBM, the removal of four Trident SSBNs for strategic service, the elimination of over 1,000 strategic missiles and bombers and 450 ICBM silos, and destruction of over 3,000 tactical nuclear warheads – all are changes that flow from decisions made in the 1990s.

No decisions have been made in this decade that bring this process to a next new and different phase of deep reductions. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review that Mrs. Rocca refers to as having allowed “historic reductions” did in fact not stipulate any new nuclear
weapons reductions beyond those decided in the 1990s; it implements them. Indeed, the 2001 NPR slowed down some reductions and canceled others (see figure 2).

### Figure 2: Nuclear Posture Visions and Decisions Then and Now

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountable stockpile</td>
<td>• 3000-3500 START II accountable strategic warheads by 2003/2007</td>
<td>• 3800 “operationally deployed strategic warheads” by 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2000-2500 START III accountable warheads by 2008</td>
<td>• 1700-2200 “operationally deployed strategic warheads” by 2012 (excluding warheads on 2 SSBNs in overhaul)</td>
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<td>Total stockpile</td>
<td>• 7500 warheads by 2003/2007, including 3500 strategic, 950 non-strategic, and 3050 reserve warheads</td>
<td>• 5450 warheads by 2012, including 2190 strategic, 500 non-strategic, and 2760 reserve warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 5500 warheads by 2008, including 2500 strategic, 500 non-strategic, and 2500 reserve warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBNs</td>
<td>• reduce from 18 to 14 by 2003/2007</td>
<td>• reduced from 18 to 14 in 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• retain 2-coast basing</td>
<td>• retain 2-coast basing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trident I C4</td>
<td>• retire by 2003/2007</td>
<td>• convert 4 excess SSBNs to SSGN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trident II D5</td>
<td>• arm all 14 SSBNs from 2003/2007</td>
<td>• retired in October 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• download warheads to meet force level reductions</td>
<td>• arm all 14 SSBNs from 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• continue production past 1995</td>
<td>• download warheads to meet force level reductions</td>
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<tr>
<td>MX/Peacekeeper</td>
<td>• retire by 2003/2007</td>
<td>• continue production until 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>• 450-500 missiles in 3 wings</td>
<td>• fund life-extension program</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• no MIRV by 2003/2007</td>
<td>• retired by October 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• replace guidance system and propulsion</td>
<td>• 450 missiles in 3 wings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Retire W62</td>
<td>• retain some with MIRV</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-2</td>
<td>• no more than 20 required for nuclear mission</td>
<td>• retire W62 by 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>• reduce to 66</td>
<td>• replace guidance system and propulsion</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• retain (but reduce) nuclear cruise missiles through 2030</td>
<td>• 21 nuclear capable</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>• reoriented to conventional role, but retain nuclear rerole option</td>
<td>• reduce to 56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-strategic forces</td>
<td>• eliminate carrier and surface ship nuclear weapons capability</td>
<td>• retain (but reduce) nuclear cruise missiles through 2030</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• maintain TLAM/N on SSNs</td>
<td>• retire ACM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• maintain DCA strength in US and Europe</td>
<td>• no nuclear rerole required by 2004</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• retain F-15E DCA</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• maintain TLAM/N on SSNs</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• maintain DCA and “several hundred” nuclear bombs in Europe</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• F-35 JSF replaces F-16 DCA</td>
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Weapons research and production

- develop and deploy B61-11
- study low-yield options, including PLYWD
- refurbish W87
- refurbish 25% of W76
- build Reliable Replacement Warhead to replace many or all warhead types in stockpile (pending)
- build Nuclear Robust Earth Penetrator with B61 or B83 warhead (rejected)
- refurbish B61-7/11
- refurbish W80 (deferred)
- refurbish 63% of W76
- study low-yield options
- design new bomber
- design new ICBM/SLBM
- study new SSBN


** Major nuclear force structure decisions since 2000 include the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2002 Moscow Treaty (SORT), the 2004 Stockpile Memorandum, the 2005 Strategic Capabilities Assessment, and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The “historical” low force level of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads by 2012 essentially is the 2,000-2,500 force level decided in the 1997 Helsinki agreement for START III, only five years later.

The future nuclear weapons stockpile resulting from the 2004 decision to cut “nearly in half” the size of the stockpile essentially is the same size that the START III force level would have created, only five years later.

Overall, the 2001 NPR makes a virtue out of necessity by implementing strategic reductions decided more than a decade ago. By the time the 2001 NPR/SORT force level is achieved on December 31st, 2012, it will be nearly 20 years after such a reduction was first outlined by the START II agreement and the 1994 NPR, and 15 years after the 1997 Helsinki agreement on the START III force level.

These achievements and timelines strongly conflict with the Bush administration’s claim of reducing nuclear forces “deeper than anything proposed previously,” faster and without detailed and cumbersome negotiations down to force levels “where the START II and START III processes had failed.” Instead, the Bush administration appears to be implementing essentially the force levels envisioned by the START II and START III processes.

Indeed, the Moscow Treaty (SORT), which flowed from the NPR, appears to be a gentleman agreement for each side to reduce their nuclear forces to a level they were expected to reach anyway. Five months before the agreement was signed, the CIA concluded: “Unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic forces, the Russian arsenal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015—with or without arms control.”
Conclusions

Mrs. Rocca’s conclusion that the United States has been “reducing the number of nuclear weapons and the degree of reliance on those weapons in national security strategies”\textsuperscript{20} is only partially correct and some of her examples are highly misleading. Certainly the United States has reduced its nuclear weapons and certainly it doesn’t rely on nuclear weapons in the same way it did during the Cold War. Those achievements are important.

But now we’re in the post-Cold War era, and the nuclear weapon states cannot continue to rest on the laurels of decisions made a decade ago as proof of progress today.

Because while those decisions are still being implemented, new decisions have also been made that broaden the role of nuclear weapons against more countries in a wider range of scenarios, that create new nuclear strike options, that increase the reliance on alert forces, that reaffirms the continued importance of nuclear weapons in national security strategies, that modernizes and extends indefinitely the service life of nuclear forces, that slows down the dismantlement of retired weapons, and that seeks to design and develop new nuclear weapons.

Since Mrs. Rocca was addressing the First Committee, it would have been more valuable if she had spent her time explaining how those new decisions affect U.S. responsibilities and commitments rather than repeating past accomplishments. The decisions that created them and the force structure being implemented today are getting old. This omission of today’s decisions is at best an oversight, but what’s sorely missing from Mrs. Rocca’s statement is an articulation of what the next phase is for new nuclear weapons reductions, extending reaction time (read: de-alert), and speeding up and increasing dismantlements of nuclear weapons.

This is a need that concerns all the nuclear weapons states. Rather than continuing to take credit for initiatives formulated more than a decade ago, the United States and the other nuclear weapons states need to take bold new steps that unequivocally demonstrate that they have moved the nuclear disarmament process to a new and different phase that has an end goal.

\textsuperscript{1} Christina Rocca, Permanent Representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, \textit{Prepared Statement to the General Debate in the First Committee}, October 9, 2007.
\textsuperscript{3} Christina Rocca, Permanent Representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, \textit{Prepared Statement to the General Debate in the First Committee}, October 9, 2007, p. 1.
A sub-category of the Global Strike mission is called Prompt Global Strike, which includes conventional weapons.

General Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Change of Command/Retirement Ceremony, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska, July 9, 2004, p. 1. Emphasis added.


Christina Rocca, Permanent Representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, Prepared Statement to the General Debate in the First Committee, October 9, 2007, p. 1.


Richard B. Myers, General, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, answers to Advance Questions for General Richard B. Myers, Nominee for the Position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, July 24, 2003, p. 15.

Thomas P. D’Agostino, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, Prepared Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 5, 2006, p. 10.


Christina Rocca, Permanent Representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, Prepared Statement to the General Debate in the First Committee, October 9, 2007, p. 3.

U.S. Department of State, “Article VI of the NPT,” fact sheet provided to the second session of the preparatory committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, May 1, 2003, n.p. [Internet version, pages 2 and 5 of 7].


Christina Rocca, Permanent Representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, Prepared Statement to the General Debate in the First Committee, October 9, 2007, p. 2.