

Preparatory Committee for the 2010
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
30 April - 11 May 2007, Vienna

Governmental Positions on Selected Topics

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The following is a brief summary of governmental positions on some salient reoccurring issues at the NPT PrepCom that took place from 30 April – 11 May 2007 in Vienna. The summaries come from comments made by participant States Parties, both in working papers submitted to the conference and in speeches given during the General Debate. In addition to the summaries, there are two accompanying spreadsheets that indicate graphically the countries that made mention of each of these particular topics. One spreadsheet covers comments made during the General Debate and the other covers comments made in working papers.

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IRAN

1. **Australia:** Iran's continued "defiance" of the IAEA and SC in continuing work on uranium enrichment was mentioned, as were Iran's "serious violations" of their NPT nuclear safeguards obligations. UNSC resolutions and sanctions were not specifically mentioned. In General Debate comments the defiance of IAEA and UNSC resolutions was mentioned as threatening to the nonproliferation regime.
2. **Canada:** Canada labeled Iran a "prominent challenge" to nonproliferation norms and mentioned UNSC resolutions.
3. **China:** China made a point of stating that the "Iranian nuclear issue" should be settled through negotiation and "as long as Iran fulfills its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT, its right of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected." No mention was made of UNSC resolutions or lack of compliance. In fact, China wrote, "Exerting pressure, imposing sanction or resorting to force are not effective ways to resolve problems."
4. **France:** UNSC resolutions were mentioned and Iran's failure to comply was "deplored." France "expects" Iran to comply with its international obligations.
5. **Germany / EU:** UNSC resolutions were mentioned, as was Iran's continued non-compliance with these resolutions. No mention was made of further sanctions, but the EU did state, "The EU is united in its resolve not to allow the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire military nuclear capabilities and to see all consequences of its nuclear programme, in terms of proliferation, resolved."
6. **Japan:** UNSC resolutions were mentioned, as was Iran's failure to comply. In the General Debate, Japan stated that Iran represents a serious challenge to the international community and they will continue to urge Iran to adopt the EU3 + 3 proposal and resume negotiations.
7. **New Zealand:** New Zealand voiced its concern about Iran's nuclear program and made general mention of UNSC resolutions. Iran was urged to comply with these and IAEA resolutions.
8. **Norway:** Concern was expressed over continued enrichment activities and Iran was urged to comply with UNSC resolutions.
9. **Republic of Korea:** Iran's noncompliance with safeguard obligations was noted, as were the UNSC resolutions and their demands in a general manner.
10. **Russian Federation:** The situation surrounding Iran's nuclear program was described as "tense." Russia said they "expect" Iran to comply with IAEA and UNSC "appeals."
11. **Switzerland:** UNSC resolutions were mentioned and Iran was encouraged to comply with these as well as IAEA obligations.

- 12. The Group (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden):** UNSC resolutions and Iran's non-compliance were noted, as was the need to reestablish the Additional Protocol in order to have confidence in Iran's compliance with IAEA standards and confidence in the peaceful purposes of Iran's nuclear program.
- 13. United Arab Emirates:** The need to peacefully resolve the "crisis of Iran's nuclear program" in accordance with the UNSC resolutions and IAEA guidelines was mentioned.
- 14. United Kingdom:** Iran's defiance of the international community was "deplored." The UK issued a "demand" that Iran comply with UNSC resolutions. In the General Debate, the UK expressed its continued "serious concern" over Iran's nuclear program and its decreased cooperation with the IAEA.
- 15. United States:** The U.S. papers mention UNSC resolutions, Iran's secret acquisition and use of sensitive fuel cycle materials, continued defiance of the UNSC resolutions, and their continued violations of NPT obligations. The U.S. does not discuss the need for further UNSC sanctions. In the General Debate the U.S. accused Iran of using Article IV as a "political cover for efforts... to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons."

DPRK

1. **Australia:** The DPRK's nuclear test was said to be a "fundamental challenge" to the NPT and its goals.
2. **Canada:** The nuclear test by the DPRK was mentioned as a contrast to the disarmament efforts of the nuclear weapons states, and concern was expressed that "others may be seeking to acquire [nuclear weapons]" as well. In the General Debate, the DPRK's nuclear test was called an "irresponsible action," and UNSC resolutions were mentioned.
3. **China:** Mention was made of China's commitment to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. No mention was made of the DPRK's nuclear test or of any specific UNSC resolutions.
4. **France:** UNSC resolutions were mentioned, and France called for the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear programs.
5. **Germany / EU:** Mentioned UNSC resolutions, condemned nuclear test, and called for denuclearization of Korean peninsula.
6. **Ireland / NAC:** The test, which the NAC condemned, was mentioned in relation to the dangers of avoiding nuclear disarmament and how that position may force other states to think about pursuing the same path as the DPRK.
7. **Japan:** Mentioned UNSC resolutions, condemned the October nuclear test, emphasized the need to de-nuclearize the Korean peninsula, and highlighted the danger of states withdrawing from the Treaty. In the General Debate Japan strongly stated, "DPRK's nuclear development cannot be possibly tolerated."
8. **New Zealand:** New Zealand expressed that it was "extremely disappointed" at the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK. The DPRK was urged to comply with its commitments under the 6-party talks and to return to active membership of the NPT.
9. **Norway:** The DPRK's test was condemned and Norway stated that the DPRK is still bound to its NPT obligations. The need to denuclearize the Korean peninsula was also mentioned.
10. **Philippines:** Mentioned they "remain hopeful" North Korea would abide by their commitments made in return for economic aid and political concessions.
11. **Republic of Korea:** Their nuclear weapon program was said to have "long been a source of serious concern" and international criticism of their nuclear test was noted. The DPRK was urged to make further progress with the 6-party talks.
12. **Russian Federation:** Pointed out that there was no DPRK representative at the meeting while discussing current problems in the nonproliferation regime.
13. **South Africa:** Mentioned the need to work for an early return of the DPRK to the NPT and IAEA.
14. **Switzerland:** Switzerland encouraged the states involved in the 6-party talks to arrive at a successful conclusion and urged DPRK to work with the IAEA and rejoin the NPT.

- 15. United Kingdom:** The UK deplored the DPRK's "claimed possession of nuclear weapons and its claim to have tested a nuclear device." Mention was made of UNSC resolutions and the DPRK was called upon to comply with these and IAEA obligations.
- 16. United States:** Papers discuss the DPRK's secret weapon program, nuclear test, withdrawal from the NPT, UNSC resolutions, and 6-party talks.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: STANDING BUREAU OR SECRETARIAT

- 1. Canada:** Canada reminded the PrepCom that they had suggested establishing a small standing bureau of the NPT at the 2005 Review Conference. This bureau would “convene extraordinary sessions in the event that a State party submits a notification of intent to withdraw from the treaty, or if other situations arise that threaten the integrity or viability of the NPT. Its members would also act as stewards of the Treaty and provide much-needed continuity throughout the review cycle. They could also interact with other diplomatic entities or processes relevant to the Treaty’s purposes (e.g. with respect to the six-party talks on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).” This standing bureau, together with newly established annual meetings, would “provide a powerful instrument for enhanced accountability of States Parties for their fulfillment of their Treaty commitments. Better accountability is a stimulus for better implementation.”
- 2. Republic of Korea:** “The Republic of Korea shares the concern that the current inertia in the NPT system may stem from an unavoidable institutional deficit. We believe that the NPT needs better tools to respond more effectively and promptly to extraordinary and troubling situations involving threats to the Treaty. In this regard, we welcome proposals suggested so far to adopt new arrangements for a more regular conference that would have decision-making power and be served by a small secretariat.”
- 3. Cuba / NAM:** The NAM called for the establishment of a standing committee concerned with implementing the Middle East Resolution from the 1995 NPT Review Conference, and especially to work toward bringing Israel into the Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state, with all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
- 4. Oman / League of Arab States:** The LAS used language similar to that of NAM, calling for the establishment of a standing committee made up of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to, “follow up the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East... in particular the prompt accession by Israel to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards,”

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM, OTHER

- 1. Canada:** Canada proposed annual meetings, fuller participation for civil society in NPT meetings, and the need to address Article X and withdrawal from the Treaty before further challenges emerge.
- 2. Cuba / NAM:** In two separate places, the papers call for establishing a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to “focus on the issue of fulfillment of the obligations under article VI,” and for the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to “consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.”
- 3. France:** France suggested reflecting on “rules of procedure” for discussions during the Review Conference cycle.
- 4. Iran:** Called for the establishment of a subsidiary body under Main Committee II to implement the resolution for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Iran also called for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to draft legally binding NSAs from the five nuclear weapon States Parties to the “non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty.” This, of course, omits Israel and the other three non-States Parties to the NPT from such security assurances.
- 5. Norway:** Two “important institutional matters” were mentioned: Article X and sustaining the NPT. Added was the comment, “We should also value of the contributions provided by civil society.”
- 6. Oman / League of Arab States:** Reference was made to the need to establish reporting of nuclear-related transfers to Israel and the need to establish a subsidiary body within Committee II to discuss implementing the Middle East resolution and to “prepare a follow-up mechanism” to monitor this implementation.
- 7. Philippines:** Hope for progress in “strengthening of the NPT's institutional framework to handle violations” was expressed.
- 8. United Arab Emirates:** Suggested the establishment of a subsidiary body to explore ways to implement the 1995 Review Conference resolution on the Middle East.
- 9. United States:** Emphasized the need to more effectively deter states from withdrawing from the NPT (and punishing those who do).

COOPERATION, STATES NEVER PARTY TO THE NPT

1. **Brazil:** “Any attempt to accommodate a 'de facto' nuclear status for those States [outside the Treaty] will contradict the letter and spirit of the NPT.”
2. **Cuba / NAM:** The need to end nuclear cooperation with Israel was singled out in three separate places. Cuba/NAM also expressed their desire for a “prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.” In the General Debate, Cuba/NAM said that states must “refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements” both with other nuclear weapon states and with non-nuclear weapon states.
3. **Egypt:** “Policies of extending cooperation in the nuclear field to non-NPT States cannot run but counter to the provisions of the Treaty and to the detriment of its objectives and credibility. Policies of cooperation with non-NPT States need to be halted promptly and reversed with no delay.” Also, “It is... in direct contravention with the Treaty, as expressed in the 2000 Final Document, to engage in nuclear cooperation with any State whose nuclear facilities are not under IAEA full-scope safeguards.”
4. **Germany / EU:** Generally spoke about NSG and PSI export control requirements for nuclear cooperation without specifically mentioning any country. Called for the “universal application” of export guidelines for nuclear technology and materials. In the General Debate, the following comment was made, which could reflect concern over the proposed U.S. – India nuclear cooperation deal: “EU Member States should abide by the NSG's requirement that transfers of trigger list items can only be made to States which have in place a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. EU Member States are also working within the NSG to ensure that the ratification of the Additional Protocol becomes a condition of export of controlled nuclear and nuclear related items and technology.”
5. **Indonesia:** General comment reflecting concern about cooperation’s effect on the future of the NPT: “We remain concerned that some NWS have been providing nuclear material and technology through a deal to non-States Parties to the NPT.”
6. **Iran:** Specifically Israel – U.S. cooperation was singled out, as was the inaction of the Security Council to “fulfil its Charter-based responsibility” to address Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, which constitutes a threat to international peace and security. An agreement for nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Israel from 2000 was used as evidence of the U.S.’s “total disregard” for its NPT obligations and of U.S. non-compliance with NPT provisions.

- 7. Ireland / NAC:** This comment is probably aimed at the U.S. – India cooperation deal: “At the Review Conference in 2000 States Parties also reaffirmed the unanimous agreement at the Review and Extension Conference in 1995 not to enter into new nuclear supply arrangements with parties that did not accept IAEA full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities. Recent developments have given us grounds for serious concern about the implications for the Treaty of such arrangements being entered into with States not Party to the NPT.”
- 8. Japan:** Specifically, India (they did not however make a definitive statement condemning the proposed cooperation deal with the U.S.) – “Japan recognizes India’s strategic importance, and taking into consideration global warming, understands its need to meet increasing energy demands by utilizing nuclear energy. On the other hand, concerning international civil nuclear cooperation with India, which is not a party to the NPT, Japan needs to consider carefully its position, while examining the various factors including its implications on the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Based upon these viewpoints, the Government of Japan will continue to participate proactively in the discussions on this subject in the international forums.” Japan also mentioned the need to tighten export standards within the NSG, which can be read as another non-specific condemnation of nuclear cooperation with India, and by extension with Israel and Pakistan.
- 9. Kenya:** This statement could be directed at the proposed U.S. – India nuclear cooperation deal: “Attempts by States to conclude bilateral agreements on nuclear energy outside the framework of the Treaty must be discouraged as they can only undermine the integrity of the Treaty.”
- 10. Malaysia:** Specifically, Israel – “Pending Israel's accession to the Treaty, Malaysia would call upon the weapons States to immediately and unconditionally halt the transfer of relevant nuclear weapons, materials, goods and technology to that country. Malaysia is of the view that such cases whereby a non-party is accorded preferential treatment in comparison to States Parties, constitutes a gross violation of the spirit and letter of the Treaty.” This next comment probably is aimed at the proposed U.S. – India cooperation deal: “... Malaysia is also concerned that access by certain States not party to the NPT to nuclear materials, technology and know-how that could be diverted to the development of nuclear weapons, is being facilitated by certain nuclear weapon States.” Malaysia called for states to join it in supporting “a total and complete prohibition on the transfer of all nuclear related materials, resources, assistance and cooperation in nuclear scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty, without exception.”
- 11. Namibia:** “Namibia is concerned about the ability of some States not Parties to the Treaty to obtain, from some Nuclear Weapon States nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop Nuclear Weapons.”

- 12. Oman / League of Arab States:** Specifically Israel - called for obligations from nuclear weapon states not to transfer nuclear materials or technology to Israel and not to assist Israel in any way with their nuclear program. In the General Debate, this general comment was made: “This feeling [regretting accepting the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 and even wanting to remain a party to it] will spread as long as there are States not party to the Treaty that are being rewarded through technological cooperation by States that obtain advanced nuclear technology.”
- 13. Switzerland:** In a very strong statement against the proposed nuclear cooperation deal between the U.S. and India, Switzerland wrote, “Still in the context of non-proliferation, Switzerland takes the view that the project of cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy between India and the USA will not be without consequences for the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. If this project is carried out it will call into question the validity of the compromise which enabled a consensus to be found on the extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference.”
- 14. Syrian Arab Republic:** Specifically, Israel – “The Syrian Arab Republic expresses its concern over international indifference when it comes to putting pressure on Israel to implement international resolutions, and calls for an end to the application of a double standard that sheds doubt as to the credibility and universality of the Treaty.”
- 15. United States:** The U.S. wrote, “Article I requires that nuclear-weapons States Parties not transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. It also requires that they not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapons State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Among other actions to fulfil these obligations, the nuclear-weapons States should establish and implement comprehensive and effective export controls, and should always consider whether a particular technology transfer or activity would further a non-nuclear-weapons State party’s ability to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.”

SPACE

1. **Brazil:** Brazil mentioned their hope that the CD would be able to overcome the deadlock regarding PAROS negotiations.
2. **China:** While not directly mentioning the weaponization of Space, China did state its concern over the acceleration of the “development and deployment of missile defense systems.” China also mentioned that the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament could be unblocked and substantive work could commence on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
3. **Iran:** Iran called the efforts of the U.S. to weaponize space “worrisome.”
4. **Russian Federation:** “We would like to draw attention to the obvious link between the strategic offensive and defensive arms. The Global Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense could provoke other States into building up their own missile armaments and thus propel their spread throughout the world, as well as affect the process of actual nuclear disarmament. Placing weapons in space, including anti-missile ones, could become a key factor triggering a new spiral in the arms race.”

NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS & ELEVATION IN POLICIES

- 1. Brazil:** In the context of criticizing a lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, Brazil expressed concern over new “rationalizations concerning the use of nuclear arsenals – including the possible development of new and more accurate arms,” as this could potentially motivate other states to militarize their nuclear programs if they felt the threat of conflict.
- 2. China:** China mentioned that new types of nuclear weapons are being developed, including missile defense systems.
- 3. Cuba / NAM:** Concern was noted over the abrogation of the ABM Treaty and the possibility that this might lead to new missile defense systems and new arms races, even in space. In addition, NAM wrote, “the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes as well as the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments.”
- 4. Indonesia:** Interestingly, Indonesia mentioned, “it would be difficult for some countries to renounce their nuclear options, if the existing nuclear-weapon-states (NWS) upgrade their nuclear capability.” New nuclear weapons and elevation of nuclear weapons in policies were mentioned in an additional comment calling for nuclear disarmament elsewhere in their Statement.
- 5. Iran:** U.S. and U.K. policies were specifically mentioned as “worrisome” and a “special source of concern for the international community.”
- 6. Ireland / NAC:** Ireland called it a “regrettable fact” that there are now new military doctrines emphasizing the importance of nuclear weapons for both offensive and defensive purposes and that there are plans to modernize and introduce new types of nuclear forces. The issue of using nuclear weapons “preventively” and in a wider range of situations was raised. Interestingly, they wrote, “If the nuclear-weapon States continue to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, there is a real danger that other states will start pondering whether they should do the same.”
- 7. Kenya:** This was mentioned in the context of describing a general atmosphere of “setbacks and disappointments” in the disarmament agenda over the last decade.
- 8. Malaysia:** While reiterating the call for total nuclear disarmament, these trends were noted as disturbing.
- 9. Oman / League of Arab States:** The 2000 NPT RC concern over these policies and the lack of progress in this area were noted. “Nuclear States still maintain huge arsenals of nuclear weapons, and some are developing new generations of it, some are declaring that the option of using these weapons remains part of their defense policies and security strategies, even against nonnuclear States.”
- 10. Philippines:** These policies were noted as “grave challenges” facing the international community.
- 11. Russian Federation:** Comments were focused on new space-based offensive capabilities (see Space category for quotes).

- 12. Switzerland:** Switzerland stated their concern that “all” nuclear weapon states are pursuing development of new nuclear weapons or replacing existing arsenals and delivery systems. Switzerland added, “In our view, such attitudes not only run counter to the spirit of article IV of the NPT but also give increased importance to nuclear weapons and render even more difficult efforts to lessen the attraction of nuclear weapons for those states trying to acquire them.”
- 13. United Arab Emirates:** Called on nuclear weapon states to refrain from testing and developing new nuclear weapons.
- 14. United Kingdom:** The U.K. statement explained why renewed Trident submarines were NOT part of an elevation of nuclear weapons in their security policy and NOT part of a modernization of nuclear forces.

CONCERN OVER FURTHER ARTICLE IV RESTRICTIONS

- 1. Brazil:** While understanding that sharing nuclear technology involves “a risk of proliferation,” Brazil strongly stated, “the observance of Article IV of the NPT is absolutely vital.”
- 2. China:** “We oppose using the nonproliferation as pretext to restrict and deprive non-nuclear-weapon states of the right of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such practice goes against the purposes and objectives of the NPT and is inconsistent with the principle of balance between rights and obligations. Neither is it conducive to the attainment of the objective of non-proliferation.”
- 3. Cuba / NAM:** “The Group expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State Party to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes, which is in violation of the statute of IAEA.” In the General Debate, Cuba/NAM stated, “The free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be fully ensured.”
- 4. France:** France did not articulate any specific concern over future restrictions, but did state, “The strengthening of the non-proliferation regime does not call into question the right to make peaceful use of nuclear energy. My country will seek to ensure that the right to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes acknowledged in Article IV is protected and fully adhered to for countries that comply unequivocally with their international obligations.”
- 5. Indonesia:** “Although many states believe that access to dual-use technology should be further restricted and more closely monitored, we have to be cautioned that excessive controls on access to the full nuclear fuel cycle may unfairly deprive developing countries of nuclear energy and technology.”
- 6. Iran:** Iran argued that the development of indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capacity should not be restricted because this “emanates from the universally accepted proposition that scientific and technological achievements are the common heritage of mankind.” Further, Iran stated, “It is unacceptable that some countries tend to limit the access to peaceful nuclear technology to an exclusive club of technologically advanced States under the pretext of non-proliferation.”
- 7. Malaysia:** “Malaysia wishes to express its concern over the practice of selectivity and discrimination as well as the trend towards unilateralism in dictating the limits of research, production and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.”
- 8. South Africa:** “With regard to current discussions on the fuel cycle, it is imperative that we do not create another kind of cartel that would exclude full participation, particularly by States in full compliance with their safeguards obligations.”

- 9. Syrian Arab Republic:** Syria stated, “implementation of the NPT by nuclear weapon States must not have a negative impact on peaceful uses of nuclear energy by other States Parties to the Treaty... It is incumbent upon all States to affirm their commitment to implementing article 4 of the Treaty, in particular the nuclear weapon States, and such implementation should be done in a balanced way without discrimination. It is unacceptable for one Party to be in an exceptional situation at the expense of another Party when it comes to sensitive and momentous issues involving either technological development or regional security.” Additionally, Syria stated, “It is imperative for nuclear-weapon States to stop placing technical and commercial restrictions and obstacles in the way of non-nuclear-weapon States and allow them the opportunity to benefit from the various peaceful uses of nuclear energy in implementation of article 4 of the Treaty.”
- 10. United Arab Emirates:** “We also affirm our rejection of all attempts made by any State Party to use the Programme of Technical Cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency as a political tool, in violation of the Statute of the Agency.”

NUCLEAR ENERGY HELPING COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE

- 1. Austria:** While the trend in this direction was acknowledged, Austria's comment is noteworthy: "Austria does not consider nuclear power a sustainable source of energy. We have therefore renounced the use of nuclear energy."
- 2. Canada:** Canada stated they, like many other nations, are actively considering expanding their nuclear energy capacity. Climate change was one reason given for such consideration.
- 3. Canada, France, and the Republic of Korea:** The paper noted that the Paris Conference and IAEA both see nuclear energy helping combat climate change while providing for increased global energy needs.
- 4. France:** "Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear energy produces neither greenhouse gases nor atmospheric pollution. For these reasons, nuclear energy has a key contribution to make to sustainable development."
- 5. Japan:** "The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is vital, not only to secure a stable energy supply, but also to prevent global warming."
- 6. Norway:** Norway acknowledged this possibility but offered a caveat, stating, "While nuclear energy may have a positive impact on efforts to reduce emission of greenhouse gases, there are also severe environmental implications. Ways to handle the large and increasing quantities of nuclear waste in all its aspects in a safe, secure and environmentally sound way must be found."

MUTINATIONAL CONTROL OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

1. **Australia:** Mentioned support for the current international dialogue on this topic as a way to advance both energy security and nonproliferation objectives.
2. **Austria:** Called for renewed debate of this idea in order to provide for energy needs while preventing the misuse of sensitive materials and technology. Promoted the idea of an international fuel bank with equal access for all countries to prevent the misuse of fuel.
3. **Canada, France, and the Republic of Korea:** Various proposals for nuclear fuel supplies were mentioned.
4. **France:** In the context of discussing the new energy demands while addressing proliferation concerns, France mentioned fuel supply assurances, specifically their joint 6-nation proposal.
5. **Germany / EU:** Mentioned the need for such control to combat proliferation of weapons from civilian nuclear cooperation.
6. **Indonesia:** Indonesia noted, “the proposals [for multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle] should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment, and the development of nuclear technology and know-how for peaceful purposes required by Member States, particularly those of developing countries for their continued development.” They expressed specific interest in, and only mentioned in particular, the proposal of the Group of Experts of the Director General of the IAEA in 2005 that explored the possibility of regional-based multinational facilities.
7. **Japan:** Mentioned four proposals as part of a solution to the dilemma of growing energy needs and the risk of weapons proliferation from aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Japan also mentioned the Standby Arrangements System they proposed in 2006 which covers “all phases of the whole front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium ore supply” as a way to promote multinational control over the nuclear fuel cycle.
8. **Kyrgyz Republic:** Voiced support for Putin’s proposal for multinational centers of nuclear fuel supply.
9. **Norway:** “Norway advocates renewed international efforts for developing multilateral nuclear fuel-cycle arrangements that are proliferation-resistant and also take into account concerns of developing countries.”
10. **Republic of Korea:** “We believe that ironclad guarantees of a secure fuel supply at a reasonable price should be provided to those countries that voluntarily forego the possession of sensitive fuel-cycle facilities.” Korea welcomed the IAEA initiative on approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
11. **Russian Federation:** Discussed Putin’s proposal, mentioned other proposals, and voiced general approval of such measures.
12. **South Africa:** Mentioned in the context of preventing a new regime from further restricting Article IV rights (see “Concern over further Article IV restrictions” for more information).
13. **The Group:** Gave a general overview of the need for proposals in order to combat proliferation by limiting sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

- 14. United Kingdom:** The UK noted their own proposal for international fuel cycle management and mentioned a forthcoming paper from the IAEA on the matter.
- 15. United States:** The U.S. proposed contributing to an international nuclear fuel supply but only for those states that were not pursuing enrichment or reprocessing related technologies. The papers also mentioned several other multilateral initiatives, including the 6-nation initiative in which the U.S. is participating. The U.S. backs proposals that make concluding an Additional Protocol agreement with the IAEA a precondition for nuclear fuel supply. In the General Debate the U.S. mentioned their GNEP initiative. “Supplier states” and their role in developing civil nuclear power technology in “nonproliferation-responsible ways” were also mentioned.

WMD COMMISSION

- 1. Indonesia:** Mentioned in the context of nuclear disarmament: “the WMD Commission in its report underscored that the nuclear weapons must never again be used-by State or by terrorists, and the only way to do that is to get rid of them before someone, somewhere, is tempted to use them.”
- 2. Ireland / NAC:** While saying that only the total elimination of nuclear weapons would guarantee they would never again be used, Ireland quoted a passage from the WMD Commission report to emphasize their argument.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTS

- 1. Australia:** Australia identified the Additional Protocol along with safeguards agreements as the verification standard for non-nuclear weapon states.
- 2. Canada:** “Canada continues to regard a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the safeguards standard under Article III of the Treaty.”
- 3. China:** China said it is “worth our serious consideration” to promote the Additional Protocol.
- 4. France:** France called for the universalization of the Additional Protocol, and stated that the AP along with safeguard agreements constitutes the current standard for the IAEA to perform its mission.
- 5. Germany / EU:** Mention was made of the Additional Protocol in several places, calling it part of the “current safeguards standard.” The EU said ratifying the AP should become a condition for export of nuclear and nuclear related items and technology.
- 6. Indonesia:** Indonesia mentioned their Additional Protocol agreement with the IAEA and called the AP, “the centerpiece of the Agency's response in strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives, especially needed to derive credible assurance regarding the non-diversion of nuclear materials and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities.” Indonesia called on all States to conclude AP agreements with the IAEA.
- 7. Japan:** Japan believes all states should conclude Additional Protocol agreements with the IAEA and that such agreements should be part of the NPT safeguard standards.
- 8. Kyrgyz Republic:** The adoption of the Additional Protocol in conjunction with safeguard agreements was recognized as “the safeguards standard.”
- 9. New Zealand:** New Zealand noted that the Additional Protocol represents the “contemporary verification standard” and that it should be a “condition of nuclear supply.”
- 10. Norway:** The need for ratification of the Additional Protocol to promote a robust nonproliferation regime was mentioned, and Norway stated that ratification of the AP should be a condition for peaceful nuclear cooperation. In the General Debate, Norway called the Additional Protocol along with safeguards the “verification standard.”
- 11. Philippines:** The universal adoption of the Additional Protocol was called for to strengthen the work of the IAEA.
- 12. Republic of Korea:** Universal adherence to the Additional Protocol was mentioned as a way to reinforce the role of the IAEA in guaranteeing Article III of the NPT. The AP was called the “main driving force for safeguards and verification” and Korea thought the AP “should serve as a condition for the supply of nuclear materials and technology to non-nuclear weapon states.”

- 13. Russian Federation:** The Additional Protocol was recognized as an “effective instrument” for improving verification. Russia believes that “in the future” the AP should become a “universally accepted norm” to verify nonproliferation obligations. Russia called on all states to bring APs into force.
- 14. South Africa:** South Africa called on all states to conclude an Additional Protocol agreement with the IAEA.
- 15. United Kingdom:** The UK believes that “a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with the additional protocol represent today’s verification standard.” In the General Debate the UK urged all states that had not yet done so to agree to and comply with safeguards agreements including the Additional Protocol. The UK expressed its belief that both safeguards and AP should be “accepted as condition of supply for all sensitive nuclear items.”
- 16. United States:** The U.S. affirmed the need for universal adherence to the Additional Protocol and called for all states to bring APs into force. The AP was called “the new standard for international nuclear safeguards.”

ADDITIONAL POINTS

1. No mention of Iran or UNSC resolutions by NAM.
2. Japan mentioned the MTCR and the need to control delivery systems of nuclear weapons.
3. The U.S. made reference to the possible necessity of future restrictions on nuclear cooperation with States Parties because of non-compliance issues/fears: “Without assurances that transfers of nuclear technology will occur within the framework of appropriate safeguards and as part of a system that helps ensure the employment of such technology for exclusively peaceful purposes, such transfers would become more difficult, or even impossible, and mankind would increasingly lose the benefits that such technology can bring.” In addition, the U.S. points out that Article IV(2) only requires nuclear cooperation to the “fullest possible” extent, which it points out establishes limitations on cooperation due to proliferation concerns.