Strengthening Existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Devon Chaffee, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow,

And Jim Wurst, New York correspondent for UN Wire

Originally prepared for the Uppsala, Sweden Seminar on

Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, September 2000

Revised: April 2002

Strengthening Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones

1. Introduction3
2. Existing NWFZ in Brief

1. Single State NWFZ4
2. Antarctica4
3. Regional NWFZ Treaties4

1. Completing the Signature and Ratification Process of Existing NWFZ 6

Regional Treaties and Protocols

2. Increasing Inter-Zonal Communication and Cooperation6
3. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas7
4. Addressing Transit through the Waters of NWFZ8
5. Strengthening Negative Security Assurances for Single State Zones11
6. Extension of the Southeast Asian NWFZ13
7. Conclusion13

1. Map of nuclear weapon free zones in the Southern Hemisphere

(Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. ed. Ramesh Thakur. New York: Macmillan, 1998. p. 2)

2. Status of Regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaties

Introduction

There is no substitution for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Numerous treaties may constitute interim steps towards that goal, including the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, START I, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and several treaties creating nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs). Some of these treaties – the CTBT, the NPT insofar as it bars the possession of nuclear weapons by most countries, and NWFZs may also be regarded not only as steps towards, but also as elements of, a nuclear-weapons-free world. Thus NWFZs are strategically important because they represent prohibition of nuclear weapons on a small scale, within a particular geographic region.

NWFZs are, of course, largely non-proliferation measures, however, they have been disarmament measures in that they have provided an incentive for nuclear-armed or aspiring states (Argentina and Brazil, and South Africa) to take the nuclear-free path. The negative security assurances provided to those states by the protocols to their treaties are another disarmament measure. Yet the zones still suffer from several weaknesses: such as the fact that the African NWFZ treaty has not been brought into force, the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty remains floundering, and nuclear armed submarines of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) are still freely patrolling much of the seas within certain NWFZ.

Our hope is that the untapped potential of existing zones will not be neglected as emphasis is redirected toward emerging NWFZ. Though developing strategies for the establishment of new NWFZs is undoubtedly important, we believe that there is also significant strengthening that needs to occur within the existing zones.

The purpose of this paper is not to assess the political probability of persuading governments to take a certain course of action with regards to NWFZ. Instead we are outlining possible measures through which existing NWFZs may be used to further nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation goals. These include:

1. Ratification of existing NWFZ treaties and protocols
2. Increasing inter-zonal cooperation including through an governmental NWFZ conference
3. Creation of a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ by declaration or treaty
4. Adoption of additional declarations or protocols by NWFZs, for example barring the launch of nuclear weapons from seas within zones
5. Prohibiting the presence of nuclear-armed vessels in the waters of zones
6. Strengthening negative security assurances
7. Extending the geographical limits of existing zones, particularly in Southeast Asian

Existing NWFZ Treaties in Brief

Single State Zones

Mongolia and Austria have both declared their nuclear weapon free status through enacting their own domestic legislation, in the absence of any regional treaty, Austria in 1999 and Mongolia in 2000. Both acts prohibit the manufacturing, storage, transport, and testing of nuclear weapons within their territory. Mongolia’s legislation also prohibits the transportation, dumping and storage of weapons grade nuclear waste within its territory, and obligates the National Security Council of Mongolia to coordinate the international institutionalizing of its NWF status. New Zealand, in addition to being a member of the South Pacific NWFZ, has strong domestic legislation which established its national Nuclear Free Zone in 1987, a zone which explicitly includes its internal waters. The constitution of the Philippines contains a provision prohibiting nuclear weapons within its territory.

Antarctica

Article I of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 prohibits any military measures, including the testing of any type of weapon in Antarctica, and Article V prohibits any nuclear explosion in the region. The Treaty, therefore, bans the use of any nuclear weapon against a target within Antarctica, or the launching of any nuclear weapon from a device located in Antarctica. All five NWS have signed on to the treaty.

Regional Treaties

The regional NWFZ treaties all prohibit their party states from engaging in the manufacture, production, possession, testing, acquisition, receipt, and deployment of nuclear weapons. They also all include protocols providing security assurances from NWS. There are several significant differences among the treaties, some based on lessons learned from the experiences of previous treaties and some addressing specific regional issues.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco for Latin America and the Caribbean created the oldest regional NWFZ in an inhabited area. The first protocol to the Treaty invites states with territories in the zone for which they are de jure or de facto internationally responsible to apply the Treaty to those territories. In the second Protocol NWS give negative security assurances to treaty members, and agree to respect the treaty. Similar versions of these protocols are included in the Rarotonga Treaty (Protocol I – territories; Protocol II – assurances) and Pelindaba Treaty (Protocol I – assurances; Protocol III – territories).

The South Pacific (Raratonga) treaty improves on the Treaty of Tlatelolco in that it includes an unequivocal ban on nuclear explosions and explosive devices for peaceful purpose. Also the Raratonga Treaty prohibited its party members from engaging in the dumping of nuclear waste in the seas of the Zone. Protocol 3 of Raratonga Treaty provides a means for NWS to agree not to test nuclear weapons within the zone. A similar protocol is appended to the Pelindaba Treaty (Protocol II).

The Pelindaba Treaty goes beyond the South Pacific treaty in that it additionally bans all attacks on nuclear facilities within the African NWFZ.

The Southeast Asian NWFZ Treaty (the Bangkok Treaty) is different from the rest of the regional NWFZ treaties in that it specifies that its zone of application includes the Continental Shelves and the Exclusive Economic Zones of its party States. The inclusion of EEZs is particularly notable within the South East Asian zone given that the zones may extend up to 200 miles off the coast of a given state and several of the world’s main navigational straits and passages are located in the region. There is only one protocol to the Bangkok treaty in which NWS are invited to agree not to contribute to violations of the treaty and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the treaty. This protocol is innovative in that it also forbids NWS to "use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone." This statement can be interpreted as prohibiting NWS from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against any target within the zone (including non-member states and any target within a state’s EEZ). It can also be interpreted as prohibiting the launching of any nuclear weapons from within the zone, meaning, for example, that the NWS could not launch nuclear weapons upon submarines within the zone waters.

Administrative Bodies

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the organizing body established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is a firmly established and active organization. OPANAL is based in Mexico City and its General Conference meets every two years.

The South Pacific Forum, the regional organization that initiated the Raratonga Treaty, has relegated several monitoring responsibilities to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation. These responsibilities include collecting and distributing reports of member states, serving as a depository of the treaty, convening the Consultative Committee at the request of a party, and reporting to the Forum.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the organization that initiated the Bangkok Treaty. The Treaty established its own organizing body, the Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and its Executive Committee. States are represented by their Foreign Ministers or their representatives in the Commission, and by the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the Executive Committee. The commission meets when necessary and, as far as possible, in conjunction with the ASEAN Mnisterial Meeting. The first meeting of the commission was in 1999.

The Pelindaba Treaty was established by the Organization of African States, and the Treaty is to create the African Commission on Nuclear Energy as its organizing body. This Commission is to meet yearly and consists of 12 members elected by the member states, but is not yet in existence as the treaty has not come into force. Until the Commission is established issues regarding the treat are handled by the Organization of African Unity.

The UN General Assembly encouraged the activities of these regional authorities, suggesting that they might aid state parties in progressing with consolidation measures among regions.¹

Completing the Signature and Ratification Process of Existing NWFZ Regional Treaties and Protocols

None of the regional treaties have been ratified by every country within its zone, and many of the protocols still remained to be joined by all five NWS. ² Tlatelolco is the most thoroughly ratified NWFZ treaty with Cuba, which has signed the treaty, remaining the only country not to have ratified. In addition all five NWS have ratified protocol II of the treaty, agreeing to respect and abide by the treaty and to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty Parties.

The Treaty of Raratonga opened for signature in August of 1985 and entered into force in December of 1986. Twelve of the sixteen states eligible to sign and ratify the treaty have done so. All of the NWS have signed Protocol 2 and 3 of the treaty. The United States is the only country not to have ratified.

The Treaty of Pelindaba has yet to enter into force, though it was opened for signature in 1996. This is a serious impediment to any hopes of consolidating existing regimes and should be considered a worrisome matter. Of the 53 countries that may become party to the Treaty and the 28 needed to bring the Treaty into force, only twelve countries have ratified. It has been suggested that it will be extremely difficult to get any Arab state to ratify the NWFZ treaty while Israel still has a nuclear weapons program. ³ All NWS have signed Protocols 1 and 2 of the treaty, and France and China have already ratified. The United States, France, and Russia, however, must still ratify.

The Treaty of Bangkok was opened for signature on 15 December 1995, and entered into force 27 March 1997. All countries that can become party to the Treaty have. Unfortunately no NWS has signed or ratified the protocol to the treaty, due to the more restrictive aspects of the Traty and Protocol mentioned above. Consultations between ASEAN and the NWS reportedly continue. ⁴ It is important to persuade the NWS to agree to the Protocol, among other reasons, because of the precedent it sets for futures zones.

The ratification of all NWFZ treaties and protocols should be vigorously pursued, in particular bring the Pelindaba Treaty into force and obtaining the security assurances for the Bangkok Treaty parties. Completing the processes already underway will se the stage for further consoidation and strengthening of existing zones, and will encourage the establishment of new zones.

Increasing Inter-Zonal Communication and Cooperation

Although each existing NWFZ is in some ways a separate entity, with its own particular language and history, there is certainly room for cooperation between the zones, and perhaps even consolidation. The more tightly NWFZs work together the more solid a foundation they lay for a nuclear-weapon-free world, and the more they succeed in isolating NWS and signally a general rejection of their policies of deterrence and first use.

Perhaps the first step in encouraging increased interaction between NWFZ regimes is to have individual political leaders from different zones meet to discuss their NWF status and attend the relevant conferences in each other’s NWFZ regions. This is already occurring to some extent. For instance, Jorge Álvarez, Ambassador of Mexico, attended the UN Regional Meeting in Asia and the Pacific in March 2001 to discuss NWFZ issues, and Matt Robson, New Zealand Minister of Disarmament Peace and Disarmament to New Zealand, addressed the Council of OPANAL in July 2001.

A further step in increasing inter-zonal dialogue might be to bring all of the regimes together in one place at one time, to discuss issues relevant to their shared NWF status. OPANAL’s XVI General Conference requested that the General Secretary of OPANAL create a detailed proposal for an international conference of the parties to NWFZ treaties. ⁵ Such a conference might be an appropriate starting point for ongoing and intensified exchange of information and experiences among NWFZs, and would give zone members the opportunity to consider establishing cooperation programs among the zones. The conference could seek to include not only those states that are party to the regional treaties but also those states, such as Mongolia, with a national NWF status and who are seeking to institutionalize that status internationally.

A NWFZ conference might also be the starting point of more formalized communication and cooperation between the different administrative bodies of each regional zone. Such communication might help in areas of improving verification and other implementation methods.

Establishing a better system for interaction among NWFZs will benefit not only existing zones but also any future zones that may be established. Creating a strong forum of NWFZs may also encourage other states to increase their efforts on creating new zones.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas

In 1996, the General Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by Brazil that called upon state parties and signatories of the NWFZs to explore the possibility of creating a consolidated NWF Southern Hemisphere (NWFSH) and adjacent areas. ⁶   The concept of a NWFSH could be used to make both symbolic and practical progress in promoting regional nonproliferation and in encouraging nuclear disarmament. It could be created either by a new treaty or by joint declarations. New Zealand Ambassador for Disarmament has stated that New Zealand hopes to organize a declaration, and eventually a conference "to mark the fact that all the independent countries of the Southern Hemisphere are free of nuclear weapons." ⁷

The concept of a NWFSH faces strong opposition by some NWS. The General Assembly’s Disarmament Committee (Frist Committee) adopted a new NWFZSH draft resolution in October 2000. It passed overwhelmingly, but was opposed by the US, UK, France and Monaco. Speaking on behalf of the three nuclear powers, Ambassador Ian Souter of the UK said the sponsors would not "allay our concerns about their seeming desire to restrict maritime rights of free passage on the high seas. Unfortunately, the sponsors refused to include in the resolution the applicable passages of the Law of the Sea Convention as well as explicit assurance that the fundamental freedom of the seas was to be unaffected by their intentions." The resolution does refer to "freedom of the high seas" and the Law of the Sea Convention, but, according to the sponsors, the three dissenting countries also wanted references to customary international law which the prohibited nuclear weapons from its territory, has refused to co-sponsor the resolution on the grounds that it does not specifically prohibit transit of nuclear weapons. The Philippines argues that such transit is prohibited under international law as affirmed by the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion.

As stated by New Zealand’s Minister of Disarmament, Matt Robson, "We already have nuclear free zones in the South Pacific, South East Asia, Latin America and Africa. It’s a case of joining forces and sending a strong message to the Northern Hemisphere to come and visit, but please-leave your weapons at the equator." ⁸ Thus it appears that the sponsors of the resolution are taking a middle path by not specifically prohibiting nuclear weapons transit, but allowing for the possibility that such prohibition might be possible without prejudice to the Law of the Sea provisions protecting innocent passage and freedom of navigation.

Practically, any consolidation would have to include all four regional NWFZs as well as some incorporation of the Antarctica Treaty and its party members. Still there are islands in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean, dependencies of France, the U.K., Australia and Norway, that are not yet included in any treaty agreement. ⁹ An attempt to include them in a nuclear weapon free Southern Hemisphere could take the form of two new NWFZ treaties, or a South Atlantic treaty and an incorporation of the Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean. ¹⁰

Given the technical differences in the existing treaties, the idea of creating a new blanket NWFZ treaty to unite the Southern Hemisphere might entail more work than would be justified by any practical achievements. A system of declarations and identical protocols that strengthen the link between the zones might be more appropriate. For instance, in a chapter entitled "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere" Terence O’Brian suggests that all states in the Southern Hemisphere might make a joint declaration that they no longer wish their region to be defended by nuclear weapons. ¹¹ Also, the zones might collectively ask for stronger commitments from NWS through a common declaration, as is suggested in a NWFZ page of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website. ¹² For instance, the NWFZ states might ask NWS to agree not use nuclear weapons against targets in the seas within the Southern Hemisphere or not to launch weapons from those seas; this could also be narrowed to seas within the existing zones. Such an agreement could take the form of declarations made by NWS or by an identical added protocol to each NWFZ treaty. Should the NWS resist making declarations or agreeing to protocols, the NWFZs could at least express their intention by their own declarations.

Efforts to reduce the potential nuclear weapon targets in the seas of the Southern Hemisphere might include some form of codification of the 1991 unilateral US and Russian decisions to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from deployment on surface ships. Any agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons from or on targets within the seas in the Southern Hemisphere would also impose restrictions on the use of strategic missiles on submarines that NWS continue to deploy, and any targeting of these submarines with nuclear weapons. Though it would be possible for each NWFZ to pursue these types of agreements on their own, it may be easier for them to do so in the context of a consolidated NWF Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas.

Addressing Transit through the Waters of NWFZ

Transit of nuclear weapons through NWFZs is a particularly pertinent issue because of the difficulty in distinguishing "transit" from deployment. It is prohibited for NWS to deploy weapons in the NWFZ territories. Only in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Bangkok is this prohibition I sgenerally thought to include territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles from the coast. The Bangkok Treaty is the only NWFZ treaty to explicitly include Exclusive Economic Zones (up to 200 nautical miles from the coast). NWS argue that submarines armed with nuclear weapons are only transiting through territorial waters or EEZs. However, it can be argued that, because nuclear weapons on submarines are constantly ready for delivery, such a submarine moving through waters are not simply "transiting" but rather is deploying nuclear weapons. Moreover, NWS still argue that they have the right to perform military exercises and maneuvers within the EEZs and high seas of NWFZs, in which case the presence of nuclear weapons is not merely transit. The presence of nuclear armed submarines in NWFZs is particularly difficult to approach because it involves not only difficult verification, but also the rights to innocent passage in territorial waters, navigation on the high seas, and transit passage in straits, all secured by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is also perhaps the most practically relevant issue concerning NWFZ. Therefore any progress made in limiting "transit" of nuclear weapons through NWFZs would be a significant gain for disarmament.

The issue of transit was most certainly in the mind of NWS representatives when negotiating the terms of NWFZ treaties. Though the Treaty of Tlatelolco does not address transit itself, the Preparatory Commission stated in its final document that the issue of transit would be decided by the involved state. The three subsequent regional NWFZ treaties include one paragraph stating that the respective treaty does not affect the freedom of the seas, and another paragraph stating that individual states may decide whether to allow visits by foreign ship and aircraft to its ports and airfields and transit of foreign ships or aircraft through its territorial sea and archipelagic waters or airspace. However, none of the treaties specifically establish the right of NWS to transit nuclear weapons through any part of the zones, nor does any treaty even mention the transit of nuclear weapons specifically.

There are three ways that one could work to limit transit of nuclear weapons through NWFZs. One means would be to obtain an agreement from NWS not to transit through the zones. This could be done through additional protocols to the NWFZ treaties to be signed by NWS or by unilateral or multi-lateral declarations. Obtaining such an agreement would, of course, be an extremely difficult task. Codifying the decisions not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons, as addressed in relation to a NWF Southern Hemisphere, may be more feasible. Regional NWFZs must also work to prevent situations like the one in Puerto Rico where the United States has been accused of undertaking military exercises with nuclear submarines within the territorial waters and EEZ of its own commonwealth. If the United States conceded the presence of submarines in the territory of Puerto Rico, including its territorial waters, presumably it would argue that it was permissible transit or transportation under the US reservation to the pertinent protocol to the Tlatelolco Treaty. .

A second means of prohibiting transit of nuclear weapons through NWFZs would be to have the states located within NWFZs prohibit transit of nuclear weapons through there respective zones. This could be done by encouraging individual party countries to establish such a national policy. For instance, New Zealand, through its NFZ domestic legislation, has succeeded in prohibiting any foreign ship that is nuclear powered or carrying nuclear weapons from entering its internal waters or any foreign aircraft landing in its territory. The 1987 Act declared that the Prime Minister could only grant approval for entrance of foreign ships and aircraft if the Prime Minister was certain there were no nuclear weapons on board. ¹³ There is also a bill currently before the New Zealand Parliament which, if adopted, would extend the national zone to encompass New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone and would prohibit transit through New Zealand’s territorial sea and EEZ. ¹⁴ Other coastal countries may consider New Zealand’s efforts when looking for ways to strengthen their national zones. In prohibiting nuclear weapons from being brought through their territorial waters, legally, a state must only prove that such transit is not a form of innocent passage and is therefore not a right protected by the law of the sea. The argument is strong because the presence of nuclear powered vessels or vessels armed with nuclear weapons in a nations territorial waters are not only a threat to the nation’s security, but are also a threat to the nation’s marine and coastal environment. Following this logic Malaysia submitted a reservation to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, reserving the right to restrict passage of such vessels in their territorial waters. The law is less favorable when pertaining to the ability of a state to regulate war ships navigating through its EEZ than it is for territorial waters. ¹⁵ When ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea several countries deposited reservations or declaration communicating their refusals to recognize the right of war ships to navigate within a state’s EEZ without their consent. However, several other countries deposited contrary reservations reserving that very right of navigation, and it has yet to be seen how countries will interpret the convention’s standing when making domestic legislation.

A third approach is to create a protocol to the regional NWFZ treaties by which the state parties to the treaty agree to prohibit transit through their territory. The likelihood of creating a protocol for the NWFZ treaties may depend on the language of each individual treaty. Any protocol prohibiting transit within the Southeast Asia NWZF would most likely pertain to the party members’ EEZs, as they are specifically noted by the treaty to be included within the zone of treaty application. It may also be possible, particularly if states such as New Zealand set a precedence, to create a separate global treaty, open to signature by any nuclear weapon free countries, by which party states agree to prohibit transit through there territory, and their EEZs.

Prohibiting presence of nuclear-armed vessels on the high seas would be very difficult to accomplish through national legislation, as no nation has jurisdiction over the high seas, except in very particular instances. In theory NWFZs, which are international bodies that already have delineated zones of application including the hight seas, might be in a better position to at least declare transit of nuclear weapons through high seas within NWFZs to be illegal, in light of the ICJ opinion. NWFZs could argue that the presence of nuclear weapons on the high seas within NWFZ violates the principle declaring that the high seas can be used only for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, years of established practice has suggested that navigation of war ships, or even nuclear-armed ships is not be considered such a violation. The second argument would be that deployment of nuclear weapons is illegal, and that, as in the case of piracy and drug trafficking, states within NWFZ have the right to deter there deployment on the high seas. Such an argument stems from the opinion of the International Court of Justice that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal, and is strengthened by the nature of all the particular nuclear weapons known to be on submarines. One of the judges involved in that opinion, C.G. Weeramantry, stated "assuming that nuclear weapons are deployed on naval vessels on alert status, they constitute a threat of use. The ICJ’s opinion was that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to international law, and in particular the humanitarian laws of warfare." ¹⁶

Strengthening Negative Security Assurances

One of the positions of the non-nuclear parties to the NPT is that, in exchange for renouncing nuclear weapons, they should receive legally binding commitments from the nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. This has not happened. Two Security Council resolutions and unilateral declarations by the nuclear powers fall short of that goal. The preferred routes have been a Conference on Disarmament- negotiated agreement or an NPT-related instrument, such as a protocol to the Treaty. The CD is deadlocked on all issues and the protocol proposal was not raised in the 2000 Review Conference. One of the most striking accomplishments of the regional NWFZ treaties is that they have gotten NWS to sign onto negative security assurances through protocols, while attempts to gain comparable treaty based assurances under the NPT regime have failed. Olu Adeniji notes that it has always seemed curious to NNWS that NWS "were willing to provide legally binding assurances under the nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements which are regional non-proliferation instruments, while they were reluctant to give comparable assurances under the universal nuclear non-proliferation instruments." ¹⁷

The protocols giving negative security assurances to regional NWFZ all prohibit NWS from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against states party to the NWFZ treaty concerned. However, several of the NWS (excepting China) deposited reservations or understandings with their ratification of most of the negative security protocols, stating that they would not be bound by the protocols if a) a party to the treaty concerned attacked them or one of their allies in alliance with a NWS or b) if there was a breach of the treaty concerned. In connection with the Pelindaba Treaty, and therefore perhaps other NWFZs as well, the United States has indicated that threat or use of biological or chemical as well as nuclear weapons may be a basis for the United Sates to use or threaten to use nuclear weaons regardless of the protocol. ¹⁸ The United States has signaled similar intentions with respect to its NPT declaration on security assurances. Therefore the NWFZ protocols are an improvement on the unilateral declarations made by NWSs in conjunction to the NPT only in that the existing protocols are undisputedly legally binding. ¹⁹

Nations interested in Single State NWFZs have a different problem: absent a treaty they must rely only on the declarations made by nuclear weapons states to NNWS parties to the NPT. In 1992, Mongolia declared itself a single state zone and has introduced a resolution every year in the Disarmament Committee (First Committee) of the UN General Assembly to establish international support for its declaration. Mongolia wanted some kind of institutionalizing mechanism that would include strengthened security assurances. At the NPT Review Conference in April 2000, Mongolia said, "We believe and expect that the P5 would continue playing a positive role in institutionalizing our status internationally, bearing in mind Mongolia's unique case." The final document of the NPT Conference "welcomes and supports" the Mongolian status but is silent on the issue of an international role in the arrangement. Consultations between Mongolian and P5 representatives resulted in a "statement on security assurances in connection with Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status" issues on 27 October 2000. In that statement, the P5 recognizes Mongolia’s unique status and offers positive and negative security assurance, however it does not go any further than similar political (as opposed to legal) declarations. ²⁰ It does, at least, give a reassuring precedent for states interested in following the Mongolian example. In September 2001, in Sapporo, Japan, the UN Department for Sidarmament Affairs organized a UN-sponsored non-governmental expert group meeting on "Ways and means of strengthening Mongolia’s nuclear-weapons-free status." The experts adopted "the Sapporo Report," which, in addition to other suggestions, recommended that legal instruments should be concluded between Mongolia and the NWS. ²¹

Extension of the Southeast Asian NWFZ

After the Bangkok Treaty came into force in 1996, India and Pakistan’s tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and have moved toward adoption of deterrence doctrines. In light of this development, it may make sense to extend the Southeast Asian NWFZ westward. At the Millenium Forum in April 2000 Indian analyst and activist Achin Vanaik suggested "stretching" the NWFZ for Southeast Asia, the Bangkok Treaty, to include Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. This would be a purely political statement since clearly neither intends to develop nuclear weapons nor are they likely targets of nuclear attacks. But, according to Vanaik "it would send a powerful rebuke" to their nuclear neighbors.

Vanaik’s proposal also included Nepal declaring itself a single-nation nuclear weapon-free zone. Nepal is in a situation similar to that of Mongolia in that it shares borders only with nuclear weapons states, so it cannot really be part of any foreseeable regional NWFZ. Such a declaration would be politically significant. Whether Nepal would or could seek security assurances in this scenario is a separate question. Given its location, Nepal might want to negotiate any assurances with India and Pakistan as well as the five NPT NWS. This, however, raises the problem of formal or de facto recognition of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states, something that NPT states parties as well as the Security Council are on record as opposing.

Conclusion

No NWFZ will be entirely secure until nuclear weapons are abolished. A NWFZ agreement can at any moment be irreversibly breached by the use of nuclear weapons, and every place on earth is threatened by the presence of nuclear weapons on this planet. However, the stronger and more consolidated NWFZs are the closer we come to forming a global abolition regime.

By strengthening existing NWFZs not only will a better precedence be set for future zones, but also the creation of new zones will be facilitated and encouraged by a tighter community of existing zones. As the domain free of nuclear weapons expands, progress may be made in areas such as verification, where practical enforcement on a regional scale could serve as proof that similar models will work on a global level. Also, as there is more cooperation between zones, they will appear less as isolated regions and more as a single consistent geographical entity surrounding any isolated nation that still holds on to the anachronistic idea that nuclear weapons are at all compatible with sustainable global security. Consolidating NWFZs will fortify the international norm that nuclear weapons are indeed illegitimate.

Frustrated with the lack of progress towards a Nuclear Weapons Convention, there is often talk of following the model of the Landmines Convention by creating an "Ottawa Process" for nuclear weapons - in other words, building a "coalition of the willing" or "like-mined states" or "middle powers" to create a treaty that could eventually grow into a universal regime. Though there are certain inaccuracies in this analogy (the nuclear weapons manufacturing industry is quite different from that of landmines) it is somewhat useful in describing a strategy of isolation in which NWFZs may play an important role. The strength of that strategy relies not only on the geographic expanse of NWFZs around globe, but on the details of the obligations in the NWFZ treaties and protocols, their enforcement, and the ability of the zones to work together to fulfil their overarching purpose. The more NWFZs are fortified and consolidated the more significant their presence in the face of NWSs.

The final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference recognizes that "the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament." It is also important to keep in mind that the existence of NWFZs need not be static symbols of past achievements in disarmament and nonproliferation, but, as demonstrated in this paper, can continue to serve as tools for furthering such objectives in ways that exceed the accomplishment of their mere establishment.

1. Map of existing nuclear weapon free zones

(Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. ed. Ramesh Thakur. New York: Macmillan, 1998. p. 2)

2. Map of 200 mile extensions

(UN document A/40/535)

3. Status of Regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaties

Foot Notes

¹ A/RES/51/45 10 December 1996.

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